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Searching and Seizing After 9/11:
Richard Jochelson,*
Developing and Applying Empirical
Michael Weinrath** and
Melanie Janelle Murchison*** Methodology to Measure Judicial
Output in the Supreme Court's
Section 8 Jurisprudence
In 2005, Margit Cohn and Mordechai Kremnitzer created a multidimensional model
to measure judicial discourse inherent in the decision making of constitutional
courts. Their model set out multiple indicia by which to measure whether the court
acted within proper constitutional constraints in order to determine the extent
to which a court rendered a decision that was activist or restrained. This study
attempts to operationalize that model. We use this model to analyze changes in
interpretation of search and seizure law under section 8 after the enactment of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at the Supreme Court of Canada.
The authors attempt to determine whether or not there were significant changes
in the levels of measurable judicial discourse after 9/11. They explain how the
model can be adapted into a Canadian context and justify the adapted model.
The last part of the paper undertakes the application of the model to all Supreme
Court cases since 1982 that explored Charter-based search and seizure issues.
Ultimately, the paper finds significant changes in judicial discourse for certain
types of judicial output, which indicate a more conservative approach to judicial
decision making in the period after 9/11. The adapted model serves as a reminder
that courts exercise their decision making through discourse that moves in
numerous directions in any given era and that likely does so differently in alternate
areas of law. Future research applying the Cohn/Kremnitzer model promises rich,
complex analysis that will serve to enrich our understandings of law and society.
En 2005, Margit Cohn et Mordechai Kremnitzer ont cr66 un mod6le
multidimensionnel pour mesurer le discours judiciaire inh6rent A la prise de
d6cision par les tribunaux constitutionnels. Afin de d6terminer dans quelle mesure
un tribunal a rendu une d6cision activiste ou empreinte de retenue, le mod6le
propose de nombreux indices pour 6valuer si le tribunal a agi en respectant les
limites constitutionnelles approprides. La prdsente 6tude tente d'opdrationnaliser
ce mod6le. Les auteurs utilisent ce mod6le pour analyser les changements dans
l'interpr6tation, par la Cour supr6me du Canada, des dispositions de Particle 8
de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert6s sur les fouilles, les perquisitions
et les saisies. Les auteurs tentent de dterminer s'il y a eu des changements
importants et mesurables dans le discours judiciaire A la suite des ev6nements
du 11 septembre 2001. Is expliquent comment le mod6le peut 6tre adapt6 A un
contexte canadien et justifient le mod6le adapt6. La derni6re partie de l'article
applique le mod6le A tous les arr6ts de la Cour supr6me prononcds depuis
1982 dans lesquels il a 6t6 question de la Charte relativement A des fouilles,
des perquisitions et des saisies. En conclusion, 'article constate que le discours
judiciaire a subi des changements importants pour ce qui est de certains types
de d6cisions, ce qui semble indiquer une mdthodologie de prise de d6cision
empreinte d'une plus grande prudence au cours de la pdriode postdrieure au
11 septembre 2001. Le mod6le adapt6 rappelle que le discours des tribunaux,
lorsqu'ils exercent leur pouvoir d6cisionnel, prend de nombreuses directions
A une 6poque donnde et qu'il le fait probablement diffdremment dans d'autres
domaines du droit. Les recherches futures sur I'applicationde la th6orie CohnKremnitzer devraient mener a une analyse riche et complexe qui enrichira notre
comprdhension du droit et de la soci6t6.
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Introduction: studying changes in search and seizure law in the
"SecuritizedSociety"
In the past ten years, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the
news, popular media, politicians, activists, and social scientists have all
expressed suppositions on the broader effects that these events have had
on Canadian society. Certainly, in the context of legal scholarship there are
some who have argued that certain cases are illustrative of the increasingly
security focused nature ofjudicial decisions that govern the law of criminal
procedure.' Indeed the events of 9/11 are recognized in the scholarship as
1. For Canadian examples see Richard Jochelson, "Multidimensional Analysis as a Window into
Activism Scholarship: Searching for Meaning with Sniffer Dogs" (2009) 24:2 CJLS 231 [Jochelson,
"Sniffer Dogs"]; Richard Jochelson, "Trashcans and Constitutional Custodians: The Liminal Spaces
of Privacy in the Wake of Patrick" (2009) 72:2 Sask L Rev 199 [Jochelson, "Trashcans"]; Richard
Jochelson, "Talking Trash with the Supreme Court of Canada: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Under the Charter" in Kirsten Kramar, ed, Criminology: CriticalCanadianPerspectives (Don Mills,
ON: Pearson Canada, 2011) at 255; Richard Jochelson, "Crossing the Rubicon: Of Sniffer Dogs,
Justifications, and Preemptive Deference" (2008) 13:2 Rev Const Stud 209 [Jochelson, "Rubicon "].
In an American context see William Bloss, "Escalating U.S. Police Surveillance after 9/11: an
Examination of Causes and Effects" (2008) 4:3 Surveillance & Society 208 at 208.
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being a "watershed" moment that, on an international and national scale,
"provided the catalyst for the widening of police surveillance and search
authority." 2 This event has manifested in what some have described as
a governance strategy of "preventive law enforcement,"' under which
"police often lack the [person]power and technical expertise to keep pace
with global terrorists and criminals." Thus, they have employed "public
safety strategies" that enhance a more "prominent police surveillance and
search role"4 through the modification by the judiciary of "established
civil privacy protections."' In the Canadian context, such incursions
have been postulated to occur to certain of the legal rights contemplated
under the CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms,and in particular the
protections against unreasonable search and seizure, the rights to counsel
and silence, and the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.6
Most of the scholarship that focuses on a new "securitized" era of
post 9/11 society concentrates on the socio-political conditions of the era.
Such scholarship often refers to this new era of security as informed by
a risk averse ethic of precaution and as tending to reify certain western
democratic values (such as the desire for security) as universal.' Critical
scholars have postulated that after the events of 9/11, the legal approach to
police power constitutes a state of exception-a moment when previously
unheard of state incursions are contemplated as normalized and where the

Bloss, ibid; see also G Posner, Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11 (New York:
2.
Random House, 2003) and A Romero, "Living in Fear: How the US Government's War on Terror
Impacts American Lives" in C Brown, ed, Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the Assault on Personal
Freedom (New York: The New Press, 2003). For a more sociological treatment see Kevin D Haggerty,
"Surveillance and Political Problems" in S Hier & J Greenberg, eds, Surveillance: Power, Problems
and Politics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009). For an excellent Canadian
sociological collection on the topic of security see Richard V Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds, Risk and
Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).
David Cole, "The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism" (2003) 38
3.
Harv CR-CLL Rev 1 at 7; for a Canadian perspective see David Dyzenhaus, "The Permanence of the
Temporary: Can Emergency Powers Be Normalized?" in RJ Daniels, P Macklein & K Roach, eds, The
Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada'sAnti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2001) at 21.
4.
Bloss, supranote I at 209; see also N Abrams, Anti- Terrorism and Criminal Enforcement, 2d ed
(St Paul, MN: Thomson/West Publishing, 2005).
5.
Bloss, supra note 1.
CanadianCharter ofRights andFreedoms, ss 7, 8, 9, & 10, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,
6.
being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. ,
Ericson & Doyle, supra note 2. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, translated by K Atell
7.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); J Huysmans, "Minding Exceptions: The Politics of
Insecurity and Liberal Democracy" (2004) 3:3 Contemporary Political Theory 321; Mikkel Vedby
Rasmussen, "'It Sounds like a Riddle': Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk" (2004) 33:2
Millenium: Journal of International Studies at 381.
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tenets of freedom underpinning liberal democracy are suspended.' It has
been posited in these critical circles that police powers after 9/11 have
resulted in more secure policing strategies; however, most resistance to
the notion of the "securitized state" focuses on "grand" events such as
the Vancouver riot of 2011 or the G20 police crackdown. Following these
events there is a tendency to see incursions of law enforcement into civil
society as large scale and terrible tragedies involving massive violation
of civil liberties. It is assumed that in this state of exception the latitude
provided by the judiciary in the jurisprudence of police powers will
"expand both the reach and authority" of police to engage in searches and
surveillance.9
If indeed the post-9/11 world dictates that we live in a "state of
exception," we would expect to see such changes infiltrating the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada. We would expect to see a Court that is
fundamentally changing the means by which we seek protection against
the state. In short, we would expect to see some ramifications in the way
our Supreme Court has interpreted our constitution. In our study, we seek
to ask whether the Supreme Court of Canada has changed its approach to
constitutional adjudication in the context of search and seizure law since
9/11. Simply, we ask whether we see discursive changes in the area of
s 8 adjudication, in the court's approach prior to and after the events of
9/11. In doing so we recognize that any results we find are correlative
and might represent a confluence of post-9/11 shifts and changes to court
composition and administration.
Section 8 of the Charter protects the individual from unreasonable
search and seizure at the hands of the state. Its most basic protection
requires a court to balance the interests of liberty and privacy against the

8. Judith Butler, PrecariousLife: The Power of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004); C
Schmitt, The Concept ofthe Political, translated by G Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995); Colleen Bell, The Freedom of Security: Governing Canada in the Age of Counter-Terrorism
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011) [Bell, Freedom of Security]; Colleen Bell,
"Subject to Exception: Security Certificates, National Security and Canada's Role in the 'War on
Terror"' (2006) 21:1 CJLS 63.
9.
Bloss, supra note I at 210.
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need for security.'o In a "securitized society" (regardless of whether that
securitization was merely caused by 9/11 or correlated with post-9/11
changes in tandem with other factors) one would expect to see changes in
the way the Supreme Court adjudicates and discusses these types of cases.
These sorts of changes would be worth studying because the creeping
nature of such legal changes could be more insidious than the grander
spectacles of violations covered by the media. Indeed, the incremental
changes of law inherent in judicial reasoning measured over a period
of years could potentially affect more citizens in the explication of our
fundamental freedoms than one iteration of a grand event, such as the
G20 protests or the Vancouver riots, or the analysis of the adjudication of
a single legislative security solution, such as anti-terrorism legislation or
security certificate regimes."
Yet, developing a model to study such adjudicative changes at the
hands of the judiciary would be complex. It is difficult enough to assess
changes in legal precedent over multiple years, and certainly that is a
study in which legal researchers regularly engage. Measuring changes in
legal discourse over a period of years would be more difficult still. How
would one measure the political changes of a supreme court? This is a
matter exacerbated in a judicial context where the court often publishes
non-unanimous decisions replete with concurring and dissenting opinions.
If it seems obvious that measuring the Supreme Court's approach
to search and seizure law would be one interesting metric which could
elucidate socio-legal change after the time period demarcated by 9/11, the
means by which one sets out to engage in this study seems less than clear.
If the first part of our study is the question of whether changes in search
and seizure law after 9/11 indicate results which align with notions of the
10. Jochelson, "Trashcans," supra note 1; see also Glen Luther, "Consent Search and Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy: Twin Barriers to the Reasonable Protection of Privacy in Canada" (2008)
41 UBC L Rev 1; Alexandre Genest, "Privacy as Construed During the Tessling Era: Revisiting the
'Totality of Circumstances Test', Standing and Third Party Rights" (2007) 41:2 RJT 337; William
MacKinnon, "Tessling, Brown, and AM: Towards a Principled Approach to Section 8" (2007) 45 Alta
L Rev 79; William Mackinnon, "Do We Throw Our Privacy Rights Out With the Trash? The Alberta
Court ofAppeal's Decision in R v Patrick"(2008) 46 Alta L Rev 225; Arthur J Cockfield, "Protecting
the Social Value of Privacy in the Context of State Investigations Using New Technologies" (2007)
40 UBC L Rev 41; RM Pomerance, "Shedding Light on the Nature of Heat: Defining Privacy in the
Wake of R v Tessling" (2005) 23 CR (6th) 229; Valerie Steeves & Ver6nica Pifiero, "Privacy and
Police Powers: Situating the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test" (2008) 50:3 Can J Crim & Crim
Just 263; Jane Bailey, "Framed by Section 8: Constitutional Protection of Privacy in Canada" (2008)
50:3 Can J Crim & Crim Just 279; Jacquelyn Burkell, "Deciding for Ourselves: Some Thoughts on the
Psychology of Assessing Reasonable Expectations of Privacy" (2008) 50:3 Can J Crim & Crim Just
307.
I1. For excellent studies of anti-terrorism legislation and security certificates see Bell, Freedom of
Security, supra note 8.
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"securitized state" (due to a post-9/11 effect, court composition changes,
or a confluence of factors), our second question must be methodological:
what research instrument could provide a useful metric by which to answer
the research question posed?
In 2005 Margit Cohn and Mordechai Kremnitzer developed what they
have described as a "multidimensional model" of judicial activism and
analysis to analyze the decision-making of constitutional courts using
seventeen specific parameters which they divided into three broader
categories. The model (which we refer to as the Cohn/Kremnitzer model)
was not without controversy, however, as the term "judicial activism"
remains highly contested 2 even though the area is the site of numerous
studies in socio-legal scholarship."
The term "judicial activism," according to Russell is subject to multiple
meanings, is often used as a means of critiquing a particular decision, and
suggests, when lobbed at the judiciary, that they have somehow abused
their constitutional or legislative role.14 Charges of judicial activism are
usually meant to suggest that the court has adopted a political stance and,
worse, that this stance has resulted in judicial decision-making beyond the
"proper limits" of the judiciary."
The purpose of this study is to determine if the Cohn/Kremnitzer model
of analysis can be used to examine changes over definitive time periods in
judicial discourse, specifically as it relates to search and seizure legislation.
The Cohn/Kremnitzer method is more comprehensive than previously
articulated models and allows for an examination of a "fuller spectrum of
activism indicia."' 6 Its comprehensive nature allows the possibility that a
researcher who attempts to measure the indicia may be doing more than
developing a political critique of the court, but might instead be elucidating
the analytics of judicial decision making by recording the judicial tools of

12. R Jochelson, M Murchison & M Weinrath, "Multidimensional Analysis of Judicial DecisionMaking: Reframing Judicial Activism as the Study of Judicial Discourse (or taking the judgment
out of the Judgment)" (2011) 2 Annual Review of Interdisciplinary Justice Research 122 [Jochelson,
"Multidimensional"].
13. David Muttart writes that the term originated in the 1950s and has resulted in over 350 peer
reviewed studies: "One Step Forward, One Step Back: Measuring Activism in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2011) online: SSRN <http://ssm.com/abstract-1470709> [Muttart, "One Step Forward"].
See also David Muttart, The EmpiricalGap in Jurisprudence:A ComprehensiveStudy of the Supreme
Courtof Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) [Muttart, EmpiricalGap].
14. PH Russell, "The Charter and Canadian Democracy" in James B Kelly & Christopher P
Manfredi, eds, Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009) at 295.
15. M Cohn & M Kremnitzer, "Judicial Activism: A Multidimensional Model" (2005) 18:2 Can JL
& Jur 333; Jochelson, "Multidimensional," supra note 12.
16. Jochelson, "Trashcans," supra note I at 231.
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reasoning employed in the case law. The model, however, as developed
by Cohn and Kremnitzer is still "value laden" in that the researcher will
invariably make value judgments to determine whether the court has
behaved in an "activist" fashion. We argue that steps can be taken on a
methodological level to reduce this value judgment, at least at the outset
of the process, by developing a coding method that focuses the analysis on
quantifying the discourse of the court. What the court says about its own
reasoning can be measured along an activist scale (in place of measuring
the analyst's belief about the activist orientations of a court).
This paper consists of three parts. In Part I we develop a means of
operationalizing our metric. Our goal here is to discuss the development
of the Cohn/Kremnitzer model and to develop the instrument as a means
of measuring changes in Supreme Court discourse in the post-Charter era
and in particular as a means of comparing the discourse-based analytics
of the court before and after the events of 9/11. It is important to note
that 9/11 marks a temporal point by which to compare two sets of data.
The finding of any statistical significance here would not necessarily
demonstrate that 9/11 caused changes in discourse, but that after 9/11 the
court used different discourses which could be due to a number of factors,
including the effect of 9/11 itself on court analyses.
In Part II we explain the methodology that we have developed and
how we deployed the instrument. Here we also explain how we obtained
our findings and what we sought to measure. In Part III we describe our
findings along with a discussion of our results. Lastly we conclude with
some final observations and some conception of the utility of the model in
assessing other research questions in the future. Ultimately we conclude
that the model helps to reveal some clear changes in the discourse of the
Court after the events of 9/11, but admit that the results do not demonstrate a
clear causal effect. The results demonstrate a court that generally measures
as more restrained in terms of judicial output along the Cohn/Kremnitzer
scale, which suggests a more conservative approach to judicial decision
making in the period of time we measured following 9/11. At best, the
changes indicate a correlative effect in judicial discourse that coincided
with the events of 9/11, which provides interesting data for analysis and
for the formulation of further research questions. At the least, the model
inspires a new language of legal empiricism that creates new possibilities
for thinking about changes in judicial decision making.
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I. Developing a model ofera-basedjudicialanalysis
1. Cohn and Kremnitzer locate their model ofjudicial activism
In this section we provide the reader with a working knowledge of the
judicial activism theory that underpinned the development of the Cohn/
Kremnitzer multidimensional model of judicial activism. A further review
of the extant literature of judicial activism is, unfortunately, beyond the
scope of this paper. This brief background to the Cohn/Kremnitzer model
and the debate it addresses is a starting point from which, we hope, further
study using the model can expand.
A defined understanding of the term "judicial activism" remains a
challenge in the literature; this is not surprising because the term is often
used as a species of critique about the political leanings of court decisions.
Most often scholars use the term "judicial activism" to question the content
of judicial decision making or to question the broader theoretical place of
a court's conduct. 7 Thus, charges of judicial activism have been made by
both left-leaning and right-leaning scholars depending on the politics of a
court's decision. This motivated Cohn and Kremnitzer to develop a more
complex model in an attempt to empiricize the study of judicial activism.I
One common political strategy has been to use judicial activism as
a charge that a court has somehow flouted democracy in its decision by
contradicting or altering the intent of the legislature.19 These charges
often lead to claims that the activism of the court has upset the balance
20
of powers contemplated in originating constitutional documents.
Oftentimes, impetus for such charges stems from a scholar's interpretation
of the original meaning of the constitutional document or the legislation
at issue.2 '
Even in this context of textual interpretation, scholars are able to
contest the meaning of judicial activism. These scholars point out the
elasticity of technical legal interpretation and point out that the notion of
determining original intention contained in legislative documents is an

17. M Cohn, "Judicial Activism in the House of Lords: A Composite Constitutionalist Approach"
(2007) 1 PL 95, and online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm2abstractid=942487>.
18. Ibid.
19. FL Morton & R Knopff, The CharterRevolution and the CourtParty (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2000) at 34-53; G Schubert, "A Functional Interpretation" in D Forte, ed, The Supreme
Court: Judicial Activism vs Judicial Restraint (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1972) at 17; R Posner, The
FederalCourts: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) at 314 and
318.
20. Ibid.
21. CP Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal
Constitutionalism(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993) at 46.
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elusive exercise.22 These concerns about elasticity are rebutted by scholars
who argue that the activism of the court can be adjudicated by placing
original texts in a "natural" or "moral" context.23 Here scholars speak of
the universality of certain norms of the constitution and use this foundation
as a means of assessing unbounded judicial action as activist. 24
Regardless of moral or norm-based foundations, judicial activism has
been described as a type of unbounded discretion-a court may behave in
an activist fashion when it exceeds the scope of its bounded functioning.
Often this boundedness is described as the limits of a court's expertise. A
court is portrayed as a specialist in evidence, but as a generalist when it
comes to broad policy decisions. Thus, a court may be held to be activist
when it relies on untraditional, limited, or unsubstantiated social science
evidence. 25 Yet even this definition of judicial activism is contested.
Critiques emerge of this account of activism because it assumes that
the judicial decision is somehow the terminus point of decision making.
In response to the so-called myth of judicial finality, dialogue theorists
point out that the court is merely one adjudicator in a larger complex of
constitutional dialogue and that legislatures always have the opportunity
to respond to court decisions, even if that response needs to evoke
constitutional override provisions.2
In a dialogic model, courts are charged with responding to legislatures
who legislate with an eye to governing through policy and with efficiency.
Courts assume a role of guardianship of the constitution in such models
and it is derogation from that guardianship that would establish an act of
judicial activism by courts.27 The courts and legislatures are construed as
agonistic players in a larger constitutional formula, which by definition
must be apprised of some political tension. Cohn and Kremnitzer, in
22. JB Kelly & M Murphy, "Confronting Judicial Supremacy: A Defence of Judicial Activism and
the Supreme Court of Canada's Legal Rights Jurisprudence" (2001) 16 CJLS 3 at 8.
23. Kelly & Murphy, ibid at 10-11; FL Morton & R Knopff, "Permanence and Change in a Written
Constitution: The 'Living Tree' Doctrine and the Charter of Rights" (1990) 1 Sup Ct L Rev 533 at
545-546.
24. Ibid.
25. CP Manfredi & JB Kelly, "Misrepresenting the Supreme Court's Record? A Comment on
Choudhry and Hunter, 'Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada' (2004) 49
McGill LJ 741 at 744.
26. PW Hogg & A Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the
Charter of Rights Isn't a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 75; CP Manfredi, "The
Life of a Metaphor: Dialogue in the Supreme Court, 1998-2003" (2004) 23 Sup Ct L Rev 105 at 122129; D Schneiderman, Book review of The Supreme Court on Trial: JudicialActivism or Democratic
Dialogue by Kent Roach (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 633.
27. WJ Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007); A Kavanagh, "The Idea of a Living Constitution" (2003) 16:1
Can JL & Jur 55; L Sager, "The Incorrigible Constitution" (1990) 65:4 NYU L Rev 893 at 893.
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developing their multidimensional understanding of judicial activism,
conceive of the legislature-court relationship as one partnership in a vast
array of constitutional partnerships involving government, government
agencies, political partisans, and society.2 8 Each has a viewpoint that is
relevant in determining whether a matter has been adjudicated in an activist
manner and each allegation of activism must be placed and recorded in its
socio-political place.29 Thus, Cohn and Kremnitzer conceive of a much
broader account of judicial activism than traditionally available in the
literature, and attempt to assess activism at many different sites in the
process of legislative review.
The notion that a court may be behaving in an activist fashion when it
abandons its role as guardian of the constitution is even more contentious
in this complex of socio-political tensions. Some might argue that a court
which strikes down legislation while emboldening constitutional values is
behaving in a non-activist manner.30 Still others would argue that a court's
legitimacy in striking down such legislation ought to be compared with the
populist will of the times in order to assess whether the court has behaved
in an activist fashion. 3' Others might see less activism in situations where
courts strike legislation down, but do so in the furtherance of protection of
vulnerable populations in the face of populist dissent.32
Cohn and Kremnitzer recognise these complexities and difficulties
of interpretation. They argue that the only way to account for these
complexities is to build on a multidimensional analysis of judicial
activism. Here they rely on the work of Canon.33 Cohn and Kremnitzer
are arguing for a "justificatory" account of judicial activism-an account
that sees courts as agents of liberal political theory.34 This approach
requires thinking about judicial analytics rather than universalizing one's
political values and then assessing a court as having engaged in activist
28. Cohn & Kremnitzer, supra note 15 at 340.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid at 339; Dyzenhaus, supra note 3.
31. M Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000) at II-14.
32. B McLachlin, "The Role of the Courts in the New Democracy" in JE Magnet, Constitutional
Law of Canada: Cases, Notes and Materials,vol 2, 8th ed (Edmonton: Juriliber, 2001) at 117.
33. Cohn, supra note 17 at 115; BC Canon, "A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism"
in SC Halpern & CM Lamb, eds, Supreme Court Activism and Restraint (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books 1982) at 386. Canon developed six species of activism: majoritarianism (the usurpation of the
legislative role by courts), interpretive stability (deviation from earlier doctrine), interpretive fidelity
(degree of deviation from original intent), substance-democratic process distinction (substantive
policy making rather than democratic preservation), specificity of policy (the making of policy at the
expense of the discretion of other institutions), and alternate policy makers (the availability of other
institutions to properly exercise the requisite discretion).
34. Cohn, supra note 17 at 96.
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or restrained behaviour. The Cohn/Kremnitzer approach requires thinking
about activism from numerous vantage points and relaying those findings
rather than embarking pre-emptively on a political judgement of the court
based on left-leaning or right-leaning predilections of the scholar.
2. The Cohn/Kremnitzer model ofjudicial activism
In an attempt to analyze the complexities of judicial activism, Cohn
and Kremnitzer outline seventeen indicia of activism in their original
work." The indicia are further organized into three broad dimensions of
activism. 6 The dimensions are "traditional visions" of activism, "sociolegal deviation" activism, and "core value" activism.37 The dimensions are
organized to account for the theories of judicial activism that Cohn and
Kremnitzer argue have been most prominent in the literature."
"Traditional visions" of activism is the dimension of activism that
attempts to measure a court's decision making against established
legal values, rules, and understandings. The more a court moves from
these established norms, the more activist it will be considered. Here
Cohn and Kremnitzer outline twelve separate but interrelated indicia.
The first indicia, "Judicial stability" asks whether a court has, in its
decision, deviated from its past decisions or decisions of lower courts.
"Interpretation" asks whether the decision of a court interprets legal text
as apprised of the original meaning of constitutional text (by ascertaining
the intent of the drafters or using the plain wording of the constitutional
document). "Majoritarianism and autonomy" solicits whether the court's
decision upsets the policies established by the legislature and its democratic
functions. "Judicial reasoning" examines a court's decision and seeks to
determine whether the court is aligning itself with the usual legal procedure
or whether a court instead uses reasonableness-based tests to explain the
scope of its decision making; for instance, an appeal to reasonablenessbased standards to enhance a legal category would be considered activist
in this context. "Threshold activism" asks whether courts adhere to rules
of legal threshold, such-as the expectation of privacy as a gateway issue
in the context of unreasonable search and seizure protections, or standing
rules in the context of constitutional applications by relatively disinterested
parties. A court that exempts threshold limitations of litigants behaves in a
more activist manner. "Judicial remit" asks whether courts have expanded
their own jurisdiction beyond previous understandings; for example, a
35.
36.
37.
38.

Cohn & Kremnitzer, supra note 15 at 341, 343, 346, 347, 352.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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decision to decide a matter held previously to not be justiciable would
be activist according to this factor. "Rhetoric" asks whether a court's
decisions use prose that considers values or politics beyond what is needed
to solve a legal problem-a rhetorical decision would be more activist on
this account. "Obiter dicta" measures whether a court's decision extends
beyond what is technically required to solve the matter; for instance,
a court that pronounces on legal issues not currently before it might
be behaving in a more activist fashion. "Comparative source reliance"
examines that decision of a court to see the extent to which the court uses
international or extra-jurisdictional sources to make a decision-the more
extra-jurisdictional a court's reasoning the more activist the court is being.
"Judicial voices" postulates that the more dissenting or alternate decisions
that are made in a particular court case, the more activist the entire
decision. "Extent of decision" asks how wide reaching the court's decision
will be; a far reaching decision would be construed as more activist, while
a well tailored, more myopic, and bounded decision would be considered
more restrained. Lastly, "legal background" suggests that when courts use
creative reasoning to circumvent previously established clear legal tests
they are behaving in a more activist fashion. 9
The indicia in the first dimension rely on relatively well established
legal and political theories that have developed in the scholarship of
judicial activism. Cohn and Kremnitzer, however, argue that there is a
socio-political dimension to judicial activism that exceeds these traditional
bounds. They argue that a second dimension, "socio-legal deviation,"
accounts for judicial analytics that occur beyond the words of the judicial
decision. This dimension is mainly concerned with post-decision effects of
judicial cases.4 0 Here Cohn and Kremnitzer seek to measure the decision
as it is received in subsequent realms. Do other entities reject or accept
the judicial decision? Cohn and Kremnitzer posit that these reactions can
be measured at the level of the legislature, administrative entities, other
courts, and the general public.41 The purpose of this dimension of analysis
is to assess whether a court is perceived by external players as reflective
or deflective of emerging societal consensus.
The final dimension of analysis is rooted in the theories of those who
view constitutional guardianship as a pivotal role of courts. "Core value
activism" measures a court's decision with its alignment or obfuscation
of core constitutional values. Cohn and Kremnitzer posit that the single

39.
40.
41.

Ibid at 342.
Ibid at para 40.
Ibid.
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factor of "intervention and value content" will help in assessing whether
a court has met its constitutional allegiance obligations. A court which
makes a decision which accords with its constitutional stewardship would,
thus, be less activist than a court which abandoned its constitutional post
in the rendering of the decision. Cohn and Kremnitzer recognize that the
determination of constitutional values is complex. Cohn and Kremnitzer
argue that when the values in question are "high" content (for instance
they effect important human rights issues) and when the values are "thin"
(subject to change but firmly entrenched in the constitution-for example
equality has had changing meanings depending on legal decisions, but its
place in the Charteris entrenched), courts that appear to pay heed to these
values in decision making are acting in a less activist fashion.42
3. Trying to apply Cohn and Kemnitzer
Attempts to empiricize the study of judicial activism are apparent in the
recent scholarship, but thus far few academics have attempted to do so
with the Cohn/Kremnizer model.4 3 Those who have attempted to apply the
Cohn/Kremnitzer model have done so, qualitatively, in single case studies,
rather than attempting to apply the model to a number of cases or to a court
era more broadly."
The reluctance to apply the model stems from methodological concerns.
First, it has been posited that it is relatively difficult to weight each indicium
given that the first dimension contains by far the most indicia whereas the
third dimension contains only one indicium. 45 Second, it has been argued
that the second dimension of analysis is unduly controversial because it
delineates a participatory role for the judiciary in the social sphere. For
instance, Canada is one of the few jurisdictions where dialogue theory
has been debated and considered legitimate as a means of describing a
court's constitutional role.4 6 Third, the Cohn/Kremnitzer model has been
42. Ibid: "Our third vision of activism considers the protection of core values as a relatively
non-activist exercise, as it is a constitutional role of the judiciary. We join those who accept that
judicial output is inherently value-based, and normatively argue that in a constitutionalist climate,
the judiciary is an active participant in a broad social effort to promote and maintain 'core' or 'thin'
constitutional principles. The utilities of this participation outweigh the potential dangers--dangers
that are essentially tempered, in constitutional democratic frameworks, by an effective power of the
legislature over the judiciary and other societal restraining mechanisms embedded in the constitutional
network. We thus adhere to the argument that purely value free judicial decision-making is not only
impossible, but also untenable"; also, Jochelson, "Sniffer Dogs", supranote I at 244.
43. Muttart, "One Step Forward," supra note 13; CL Ostberg & ME Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision
Making in the Supreme Court ofCanada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007).
44. Muttart, "One Step Forward," supra note 13; M Khosla, "Addressing Judicial Activism in the
Indian Supreme Court: Towards an Evolved Debate" (2009) 32 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 55 at 59.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
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described as unwieldy because it has too many indicia to measure; this is
a matter which some scholars have deemed to be an empirical challenge. 47
The wide ambit of analysis has caused some to suggest that what Cohn
and Kremnitzer may be measuring is not judicial activism at all, but some
other new species of judicial analytic.48
The first issue pertaining to weight is not difficult to answer and it is
a matter closely related to the concerns of the third issue: the unwieldy
number of variables measured in the Cohn/Kremnitzer model. As we
will demonstrate below, ascribing meanings and weight to numerous
indicia is possible given precise enough statistical extrapolation. The
second critique, pertaining to the contested nature of judicial function as
unduly participatory, is more challenging. Certainly, the development of
a socio-political dimension of analysis disrupts the "traditional visions"
of activism normally encountered in the literature. More troublesome is
the fact that in order to assess the degree of socio-political deviation from
societal consensus, a researcher would be required to make a judgment
call about the extent to which a court deviated from societal consensus.
A similar methodological pitfall exists for the third dimension, where
a researcher would be required to determine the content and form of
constitutional values and measure a court's output against a researcher's
judgment call. Certainly scholars who situate their work in the "traditional
visions" camp would dispute these judgment calls, but we suggest that
these same researchers are required to make similar judgment calls in
determining whether activism has occurred in the first dimension. For
example, under "traditional visions" in the assessment ofjudicial stability,
would a researcher not be required to determine what they believed to
be precedent and to then posit the degree to which a court deviated from
that precedent? The amount of judgment to be exercised in this type of
activism analysis, regardless of the dimension, is open to influence (at the
conscious or subconscious level) by the researcher.
Thus, we see the broad challenge in operationalizing any judicial
activism model as a challenge in minimizing the judgment calls to be made
by the researcher. Here we suggest reorienting the Cohn/Kremnitzer model
to a discourse-based analysis of court decision-making. If the researcher
is tasked with determining the content of what a court said about its own
decision-making, then the judgment call of the researcher is reduced to
an exercise of coding rather than a decision about activism. The coding
exercise of the researcher is then an attempt to record the voice of the court
47. Muttart, "One Step Forward," supra note 13 at 13.
48. Ibid
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itself and the text of the decision becomes the empirical source of primary
research. Reimagining the Cohn/Kremnitzer model as an empirical study
of court decisions would require use of the second dimension be forestalled
for a different project. The socio-legal reaction to court decisions is not a
matter than can be coded in a content-based empirical project (an "in their
own words" methodology of the court prohibits examining the words of
other entities such as media representations of court cases).
We are aware of critiques from those who study judicial activism that
would problematize the coding project of a discourse-based project. For
instance, by relying on a court's own justifications and use of analysis, how
can the researcher make an informed decision about whether the court was
behaving in an activist or restrained fashion? Ultimately, the development
of the Cohn/Kremnitzer model was a response to the dissatisfaction
with political accounts of courts behaving as activist or restrained. The
determination of restraint or activism is largely a qualitative response to
a qualitative question. Discourse analysis provides a means for assessing
larger quantities of cases and providing an empirical basis for qualitative
conclusions about activism or restraint in terms of a court's own language.
Rather than begin the discussion with a political question (i.e., activist or
not?), the discourse approach we outline below seeks to measure a number
of parameters and to hold off discussion of a court's analysis until the
primary research is gathered.
Some scholars have openly called for more quantitative studies of
judicial activism and have questioned the statistical value of assessing
activism one case at a time 49 ; we intend to take up this challenge as
we operationalize the Cohn/Kremnitzer model. Previous quantitative
assessments have largely relied on the judgment of the researchers to
label a court as activist or restrained, while others have tried to describe
other political factors involved in judicial decision making.so For example,
Osterberg and Wetstein studied the pre-appointment political affiliations
of judges as predictive of their attitudes on issues when appointed."'
Certainly such studies provide fascinating results; however, we wish to
contribute a different empiricism to the discussion. In our study, we seek to
simply measure the Cohn and Kremnitzer criteria to elucidate discussion
about court analytics and to discuss the trends that emerge. This study of
49. Ibid at 66.
50. Jochelson, "Sniffer Dogs", supranote I at 246; see, for example, Muttart, EmpiricalGap, supra
note 13; Manfredi & Kelly, supra note 25; S Choudhry & CE Hunter, "Measuring Judicial Activism
on the Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE" (2003) 48
McGill LJ 525; PJ Monahan, "Constitutional Cases 2000: An Overview" (2001) 14 Sup Ct Law Rev.
51. Ostberg & Wetstein, supra note 43.
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judicial discourse, along the lines of an adapted Cohn/Kremnitzer model,
will add to an empirical understanding of judicial reasoning and provide
further data for theorizing judicial decision-making. An adapted Cohn/
Kreminitzer discourse scale would remove its "justificatory" predilections,
take the court's own words more seriously, and provide rich possibilities
in assessing judicial analytics apart from measuring precedential effects.52
Reorienting the Cohn/Kremitzer model towards discourse and away
from activism also reveals other advantages. Most research in this area
takes place in response to judicial consideration of the constitutionality
of legislation; however, many court decisions involving constitutional
principles occur in the absence of legislation save for the constitution
itself, which may lead traditional activist researchers to decide against
analysis (since they may be interested in the court upholding legislative
intent in impugned legislation). For example, improper police conduct in
Canada is analyzed in many circumstances quite apart from legislation, in
part because wide-ranging police powers legislation has not been enacted
in Canada." In such cases, a court may be left analyzing the constitutional
propriety of police misconduct against constitutional law alone. Our model
would allow analysis of the Court's decision in this context, even in the
absence of legislation, because we seek to measure the discourse of the
court rather than understanding whether a decision is activist or restrained.
We are measuring whether the words of the court are phrased in terms of
activism or restraint-this is quite a different assessment than previously
undertaken in the literature.
In the remaining pages of this article we unveil a test analysis of our
adapted Cohn/Kremnitzer judicial discourse test. Rather than unveiling
the test over the entire course of Supreme Court decision making as some
studies have done, we employ a different strategy.54 The problems with
measuring parameters over the life of an entire court is that all legal subjects
are canvassed, many socio-legal changes are sublimated (for instance,
changes in attitudes and norms are diluted over large and diverse swaths of
cases), and precise questions can not be asked and answered. Asking, for
instance, how the Supreme Court's approach to police powers has changed
after the attacks of 11 September 2001 would be ineffective if we studied
every area of the court's jurisprudence. What would a case about torts tell us
about the court's jurisprudential approach to state power wielded through
the police? Trying to determine the sample cases of where to delineate the

52.
53.
54.

Jochelson, "Multidimentional,"supra note 12.
Jochelson, "Trashcans"; Jochelson, "Rubicon"; Jochelson, "Sniffer Dogs"; supra note 1.
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discourse approach is, to some extent, a discretionary exercise. We have
determined that beginning the study narrowly and subsequently expanding
the examination to other areas of study is the approach that will yield the
most precise information.
As a starting point, an interesting site of investigation of Supreme
Court discourse analysis is the jurisprudence involving section 8 of the
Charter. The guarantee to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
is obviously a source of great debate since the events of 9/11. The issue
involves debates about balancing security versus liberty and the proper
role of the state in our lives since the pivotal events of that day. If the study
of an adapted Cohn/Kremnitzer discourse model revealed any interesting
data in this context it would then be worthwhile to apply the model to
other salient police powers. For instance, the study of the law of arrest,
detention, and the right to silence and counsel, would all be appropriate
projects following our analysis below.
We attempt to operationalize the adapted Cohn/Kremnitzer model
in the context of search and seizure law because of its relevance to the
security responses to the events of 9/11 and because the area has provided
us with enough case law at the Supreme Court level to generate relatively
statistically significant results in a quantitative analysis. Below we
outline the methodology of the study and our results. We then engage in
a discussion of the results, followed by a conclusion about the results and
the possibilities of an adapted Cohn/Kremnitzer discourse analysis for
future studies.
I. Articulating a discourse basedmethodology
1. Sampling
The sample for our data consisted of all Supreme Court of Canada search
and seizure cases dealing with section 8 since 1982. All of the cases were
found on the legal databases Westlaw, QuickLaw, CanLii, and LexisNexis
and the databases were cross referenced with each other to ensure all cases
that contained the search terms "section 8, s 8, Charter, Search, Seizure,
Privacy" were included. This created an original sample size of 154
cases spanning 27 years, with the first case in 1984 through to our final
measured case in June 2011 (these cases are listed in Appendix 1). Each
case was printed and then individually read through at least twice, being
analyzed for both content and relevance. For example, cases that only
made a passing reference to section 8 (such as Cloutierv Langois5 ) or to
illustrate the explication of another section of the Charteras a comparison
55.
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were excluded due to their lack of analysis of section 8. Cases that were
less than ten paragraphs long were also excluded from the sample due
to insufficient analysis and explanation upon which we could make an
assessment. After this examination, a total of 85 cases remained for
analysis. To determine whether or not a change had taken place in judicial
discourse, we divided our sample into two groups. The first comprised all
cases which occurred prior to 11 September 2001 and the second was all
cases that occurred after 11 September 2001. There were 54 cases in the
first group and 31 cases in the second group.
2. Operationalizationof the mulidimensionalmodel
Each of the seventeen variables Cohn and Kremnitzer created were
operationalized as ordinal variables in order that differences could be ranked
and meaningful comparisons made. A 1-10 Likert scale was used, with a
1 indicating the lowest level of judicial activism, while a 10 represented
the most activist type of behaviour along the lines postulated by Cohn
and Kremnitzer. During initial data collection it became apparent that in
our study only two of the three dimensions, "traditional vision activism"
and "core values activism," should be measured. The second dimension of
"socio-legal deviation" ("legislative reaction," "administrative reaction,"
or "public reaction") is not germane to our study. This left thirteen of the
seventeen variables to be analyzed, in large part because the goal of this
specific project was to measure judicial discourse, not socio-political
reaction to judicial decision making.
A content analysis approach was taken to the data collection, with
criteria established to rank the presence and intensity of a certain attribute.
In order to determine how each case should be scored on this ranking
system, criteria were identified on which to base the 1-10 ranking system
for each of the thirteen variables. Each case was assessed each time against
the content analysis criteria for ranking.We provide a basic outline of our
ranking criteria for each variable below, listing extreme ends of the ordinal
continuums. A much more detailed description is available on request
from the first author.
3. Variables: traditionalvisions of activism
Judicial stability--Here we measure how the court has behaved with
regard to its own and other relevant precedents. When the court affirms
the decisions of all lower courts we score the case as a 1. When the court
overturns a previous decision and overturns legislation and creates new
law, we score the case as a 10.
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Interpretation-Doesa court interpret a legal text in possible contradiction
with the assumed original intent of the constitution or its plain linguistic
meaning? Where the court interprets section 8 in light of an original
intent or plain meaning approach we score the case as a 1. Where the court
interprets the section in a way that is unremittingly interpretive, we score
the case as a 10.
Majoritarianismand autonomy-Here we measure whether the court
interferes with policies set by democratic processes and if the court is
willing to supply its own solution and/or policy. When the court does not
interfere with policies set by democratic processes or leaves all legislation
unimpeached we scored the case with a 1. Where the court struck down
legislation and applied its own policy or solution we scored the case as a
10.
Judicial reasoning: process/substance-With this factor we measured
how heavily the court relied, in its decision, on strict legal and procedural
grounds. Where the court relied entirely on strict legal or procedural
grounds in making a decision we scored a 1. Where the court relied on
open-ended legal tests, such as reasonableness-based assessments we
scored a 10.
Threshold activism-Here we measured the extent to which the court was
willing to forgive threshold hurdles. In this context a rigorous application
of threshold issues, such as the reasonable expectation of privacy as a
gateway to accessing s 8 of the Charter for a party, would score a I (the
reasonable expectation of privacy is the main threshold issue in s 8 cases).
Where the court found reasons to allow for reasonable expectation of
privacy where previous cases had not we scored the case as a 10.
Judicial remit-This factor asks whether the court's decision expands or
redefines the jurisdiction of the court. When the decision did not expand or
redefine the jurisdiction of the court we scored the case as a 1. A decision
that expanded the judiciary's remit into areas previously immune from
intervention was scored as a 10.
Rhetoric-This factor asks whether judicial decisions are used as
platforms for expression of broader positions and values or whether the
use of rhetoric was restricted in the court's explication of legal principles?
We scored the absence of legal rhetoric (usually correlating with shorter
decisions) as a 1. High levels of extra-legal rhetoric combined with long
discussions of political implications were scored at 10.
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Obiter dicta-This factor asks how far does the court expand its opinion
beyond the legal requirements of the specific case? When the court did
not delineate any obiter we scored the case as a 1. When the Court used
extensive amounts of obiter and discussed issues not relevant to the case
we recorded a 10.
Relianceon comparativesources-Herewe examined how extensively the
court relied on foreign sources that are not legally binding in the domestic
sphere. Where the court used domestic law exclusively we scored a 1.
When the court used comparative sources to create new legal conceptions
with extensive comparative referencing we scored a 10.
Judicialvoices-Here we examined the extent of other judicial decisions
besides the majority decision. A unanimous decision scored a 1. On
occasions where we saw two concurring and two dissenting judgments
(the most judicial voices we saw) we scored a 10.
Extent ofdecision-Herewe examined whether the court's ruling expressly
applied to a single or specified set of circumstances or whether the law that
resulted had broad implications for larger sections of society. If the court
simply applied the legal rules we typically scored a 1. Where the court
created a new standard that affected broader populations we scored a 10.
Legal background-Herewe examined whether the legal framework on
the basis of which the court made its decision was inclusive and clear or
whether the rules concerned were vague, complex, self-contradictory, or
incomplete. Where the court applied clear rules that did not extend beyond
the prior case law we scored a 1. Where the framework was murky and
when the court generated a new framework for analysis we scored a 10.
4.

Variables: core values activism

Intervention and value content-Here we examined if the subject matter
under examination was highly value laden in that it had bearing on
democratic principles and human liberties accepted domestically. Where
the case dealt with important human rights issues and the court appeared to
assert its guardianship of the constitution, we scored a 1. Where the court
declined to discuss the constitutional values at stake we scored a 10.
5. Dataanalysis
After the data was collected and coded, it was loaded into Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis. In this, our initial
study, we were most interested in the univariate descriptive outcomes for
each multidimensional indicator. How consistently did we find strong
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evidence of any of Cohn and Kremnitzer's thirteen measures of judicial
discourse? Then we compared all of the thirteen domain variable means
for the periods 1984-2001 (pre-9/11) and from 2002-2011 (post-9/11),
estimating mean differences and t-statistics (higher t-statistics generally
mean the variable tested has a reliable impact on the matter being
investigated) to determine if judicial decision making had been impacted
in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Our sample size is not large, making it
more difficult to achieve highly reliable outcomes. Indeed, it is definitely
not a random sample and represents the entire population of cases that
meet our criteria, making significance testing somewhat moot. Still, we
will use statistical significance as a way of grounding those interested in
the comparative features of our analysis. As such, we decided to relax the
typical standard of statistical significance, which is a =.05 for a two-tailed
t-test and will report levels at a =.10 one tailed, which is still a desirable
measure of significance.
We encourage the reader to not be overly concerned about statistical
significance and instead focus on the size of the differences between the
two post-Chartereras. An overemphasis on statistical significance instead
of effect size is not a new issue." To assist the reader in assessing the
magnitude of differences we will express the means in the more easily
interpretable metric of percentages by multiplying the Likert scale means
by 10.
III. What were the findings of the instrumentin the context ofsection 8
jurisprudence?
1. Descriptives
Indicator mean scores were generally low: "core values" (5.09) was the
only judicial discourse variable to attain a mean of 5 (Table 1). Closer to a
mean score of 4 were "judicial voices" (4.24), "extent of decision" (4.22),
"activism threshold" (4.08), "rhetoric" (4.01), and "legal background"
(3.95). "Judicial stability" and "judicial reasoning" were around 3.8,
while "interpretation" and "comparative sources" scored close to 3. Less
frequently found present to a high degree in our case reviews were "obiter"
(2.26), "majoritarianism" (2.13), and "judicial remittance." The standard
deviation and range scores show considerable variability in the level of
involvement by the Court in any of the judicial discourse variables. A
standard deviation tells us how close most scores in a distribution are to
56. For a more recent spirited critique and discussion see Stephen T Ziliak & Deidre N Mccloskey,
The Cult of StatisticalSignificance: How the StandardErrorCosts Us Jobs, Justice, andLives (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).
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the average. In statistics it is preferable that a standard deviation is small
relative to the mean, because this indicates there is similarity in a group
or consistency in a certain task. For example, if a football team averaged
30 points a game with a standard deviation of 5, this means they could
be counted on to score 25-35 points a game, a good steady performance.
If, on the other hand, the standard deviation was 20, then the team might
be in trouble; their scores could run from a low of 10 to a high of 50
points a game and it is likely they would not be very consistent. In the
case of judicial activism we can observe that the standard deviations are
quite high, as are the ranges between the minimum and maximum scores
reported for each indicator. This makes sense, however, because the
variables that the court considers in a given case are highly contextual and
vary from case to case to a larger degree than more simplistic events (like
a football game). Almost all indicia ranked as high as 10 and as low as 1.
This means that in several instances the presence of the indicia in court
cases were quite intense, while in others, were almost non-existent. Given
the complexity of court cases, we were not surprised that the indicators did
not score highly on activism in every instance.
2. Pre-and post-9/11 mean scores
The amount of judicial activism present declined on almost all indicators
from pre-9/11 to post-9/1 1. It is also worth noting that the entire decade of
jurisprudence following 9/11 occurred after the ascendance of Chief Justice
McLachlin."7 One possible interpretation of virtually all the changes that
have occurred in our data in this project is that the changes are attributable
to the chiefship of the latest chief justice.
Similarly, the Court also experienced other significant changes, such
as the court's composition and the absence of several of the pre-9/11
judges may alter the discourse that we are able to empiricize. Many of
these justices had left the court and their prose was to no longer have
a discursive effect on decisions; Justice L'Heureux-Dube, for example,
retired in 2003 and was renowned as a dissenter on the court. This may
speak to less measurable activism after her retirement. In future studies
we plan on running the data to cross-compare judicial era as a function of
changes in discourse. For now, we offer these alternate explanations as a
caveat to our findings. When we speak of measurements of indicia preand post-9/11 below we are not suggesting that 9/11 caused any changes,
but rather that measurable changes were found in some instances in the

57. Chief Justice McLachlin was appointed on 7 January 2000 to the position of Chief Justice of
Canada.
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period following 9/11. We urge the reader to understand this terminology
as indicative of a temporal period rather than speaking to the causal effect
of 9/11 on our findings.
The only increase was in the "activism threshold" (a small increase
of 6.9%), that might be attributable to the recent expansion of the test for
reasonable expectation of privacy in the last decade. The test is one which
is the threshold determinant of a party's access to section 8 based Charter
defences." Effects stable enough to achieve statistical significance are
generally in the small to modest range (6.6%-12.9%), indicative of the
conservative nature of our courts and their resistance to dramatic changes.
3. Most significant shifts
The most significant shifts downwards were in the areas of "comparative
sources" (-12.9%), "judicial voices" (-10.8%), and "legal background"
(-9.5%). According to its own written decisions, the Court was, after 9/11,
less likely to cite or be influenced by other nation's legal systems. In the
first seventeen years after the Charter'sinception, the Court often looked
to different jurisdictions to inform and place in context the Charterrights it
adjudicated.5 9 Following 9/11, the Court was less likely to do so. There are
various interpretations explaining this tendency. The most pertinent is that
after 9/11 we were already nineteen years into the Charter era. The need
for extra-jurisdictional information this many years after patriation may
have been less pronounced. An alternative explanation might postulate
that a court in a post-9/11 era might be more insular, focused on national
affairs and less likely to be influenced by international jurisprudence. We
also found that since 9/11, the Court has tended to agree more amongst
themselves with respect to their own decisions, with fewer dissenting and
concurring decisions, and more unanimous decisions. Certainly, this is a
factor which is easily attributable to the leadership of the chief justice.
One could also make a case for the importance that a court might place
on unanimity in a post-9/11 atmosphere. One could conceive that a court
adjudicating on search and seizure law after 9/11 might be less likely to
quibble on the record over the legal minutiae of law and save such disputes
for a less "securitized" era.

58. The Court has, since 9/11, reconsidered the threshold adjudication of s 8 of the Charterin the
form of the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis on several occasions. This might result in an
increased activism measurement in this context. For examples see R v Patrick,[2009] 1 SCR 579; R v
Kang-Brown, [2008] 1 SCR 456; R v AM, [2008] I SCR 569; and others.
59. For classic examples see Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Directorof Investigation and
Research) v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 and Rv Edvards, [1996] I SCR 128.
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The Court was also less likely to adopt new rules in making their final
determinations. The statistics reveal a court that, post-9/1 1, was less likely
to create wholesale changes to legal frameworks and deviate from the
clarity of legal rules that preceded them in comparison to the pre-9/11 era.
Certainly this observation correlates with a precedent-based assessment of
search and seizure law. The last ten years have seen novel developments
in the law of search and seizure (for instance the use of ancillary powers
to create new species of searches),6 0 but it is also the case that most of the
major changes had occurred in the first years after the Charter's advent.
Thus it is difficult to say with certainty whether the reluctance to deviate
from old tests is simply a matter of a settling effect in comparison to the
early years of the Charteror a broader tendency, post-9/1 1, to adhere more
strictly to doctrinal constraints.
4. Moderate signficant shifts
Smaller negative effects (about -8%) were observed for "rhetoric," "extent
of decision," and "judicial stability." Supreme Court justices were less
overtly political in the tone of their case reasoning. This might surprise
those who postulate that a court would ratchet up conservative rhetoric in a
post-9/11 world. The reasons for diminished rhetoric are less clear. It might
be that less rhetorical debate is required nineteen years after the Charter's
inception. Perhaps rhetoric more aptly correlates with the crystallization of
the content of rights in the formative years of constitutional interpretation.
It could just as easily be postulated that the Court is so attuned to the
security climate in a post-9/11 era that it would purposefully mute its
rhetorical prose so as to avoid provocation of the reader or to insulate itself
from the more critical consumers of its decisions.
The Court also saw a decrease in the tendency for its decisions to have
a larger sweep than necessary. The discourse of the Court suggested a court
that was interested in tailoring and limiting its decisions to the context it
was adjudicating. It is difficult to read this narrowing effect as a post9/11 effect. Certainly the early years of Charteradjudication emphasized
purposiveness and liberal interpretation of rights, but it is just as accurate
that subsequently the Court began to emphasize the importance of context
as a limiting factor in the extrapolation of Charterprotections.6 1 Is the use
of context to narrow the reach of decision making a natural evolution of
the Charteror a purposeful narrowing of rights delineation in a securitized
era? The question is difficult to reconcile apart from the observation that

60. Jochelson, "Rubicon," supra note 1; Rv Kang-Brown, supra note 58; Rv AM, supra note 58.
61. McLachlin, supra note 32.
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statistically the decisions in the context of search and seizure indicate a
court tailoring the reach of its decisions to limited contexts.
The Court also demonstrated a reduction in its willingness to overturn
both itself and lower courts (in aggregate). Again, this reduction may
be because in more "securitized eras," a court may be more likely to
steadfastly maintain precedent and respect the jurisdiction of lower courts.
Once again, however, this could simply be reflective of a maturing phase
in Charterjurisprudence where less uncertainty pervades the lower courts
and previous Supreme Court decisions, rendering deviation from these
decisions less likely.
Finally, fairly similar reductions (-7%) were recorded for
"majoritarian/autonomy" and "core values." The drop in "majoritarian/
autonomy" evidence indicates that the Court was more reluctant to strike
down legislation after 9/11. This willingness to steadfastly stand by the
legislative impetus might be construed as a court reacting to the events
of 9/11 by circling its jurisprudential wagons and standing by the state.
One could also postulate that in the first nineteen years of the Charter
era legislatures have grown more astute in the task of Charter-proofing
legislation, making the laws more difficult to be struck down by the
judiciary. In either case, it seems clear that legislation was more likely to
withstand judicial examination in the realm of search and seizure law after
9/11.
Our third judicial activist domain, protection of "core values," saw a
move downwards, indicating that the Court's lip service to its constitutional
guardianship was relatively strong after 9/11. The Court's delineation
of Chartervalues in the post-9/ll era suggests that the Court was more
willing to speak of constitutional values after the attacks. This is not
surprising. After 9/11, the cases that would have to grapple with security
versus privacy would be more exacting in this scrutiny. For example, the
cases of Rv AM and R v Kang-Brown were cases dealing with the privacy
interests of an accused in the context of public search environments such
as school gymnasiums and bus depots. It is not entirely surprising that the
value-laden discussions that ensued in such cases would loom large in an
empirical instrument such as the adapted Cohn/Kremnitzer model. This
was the first era where these interests were as heightened post-Charter.
The attacks of 9/11 certainly were not the only security events to occur
post-Charter,but they clearly received more attention than previous postCharter security-based events. The decrease in the "core value" factor
indicates further allegiance of the Court to the discussion of constitutional
values, but does little to tell us which values (between security and privacy)
the Court ultimately chooses.
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5. Insignificant effects
While the changes in "interpretation," "obiter dicta," and "judicial
remittance" were in the negative direction, we observe that the effects
are almost negligible (1.4%-3.0%) and not reliable enough to achieve
statistical significance, even with our relaxed standard. It is most likely
that these negligible differences from pre- to post-9/11 are due to chance
fluctuation.
Conclusions and possibilities
Our study of judicial analytics reveals some statistical variations in the
Court's adjudication of section 8 of the Charter in the search and seizure
jurisprudence in seven of the thirteen areas measured. Six of the areas
reveal a decrease in the use of activism-related discourse. Notably, the
Court seems to be acting in a prudent and measured fashion in reversing
fewer previous cases ("judicial stability"), in stating that it is respecting
legislative intention more frequently ("majoritarianism/autonomy"),
in limiting the Court's jurisdiction and the scope of the application
of its decisions by using bounded legal tests in place of open-ended
reasonableness-based calculations, tailoring the scope of its decision
to specific contexts rather than creating legal decisions with broad and
sweeping effect, and in limiting its creation of new rules as a wholesale
mechanism of dealing with legal problems ("judicial reasoning," 'judicial
remit," "extent of decision," and "legal background"). The Court also seems
to be curbing its previous tendency to use international sources to buttress
its decision making ("comparative sources"), and seems further committed
to diminishing dissenting or concurring voices on the court ("judicial
voices"). The Court has engaged in less overtly rhetorical posturing as
compared to the pre-9/11 period ("rhetoric"), while simultaneously
justifying its decision making in accordance with principles delineated
as foundational in the discussion of constitutional values ("core values").
While the Court appears to have allowed more parties to have access
to making a section 8 claim (as evidenced by the increase in "activism
threshold"), the threshold entry into the legal debate by the party seems to
be muted by the other discourse-based indicia measured.
The results seem to indicate a Supreme Court that is applying a
guarded interpretation of legal rights and law in the adjudication of s 8
of the Charterafter the period beginning with 9/11. The Court is one that
takes precedent, legislative intention, and its limited role in the legislative
dialogue more seriously than the pre-9/11 Court. The post-9/11 Court is
less likely to use large amounts of its adjudication to pontificate on the
political debates inherent in the adjudication of search and seizure, and is
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geared towards creating more unified and limited decisions in this context.
These empirical findings suggest that the Court has adopted a more guarded
approach towards constitutional interpretation in the post-9/11 era. It is a
Court that, in its own words, is cautiously navigating the terrain of police
powers. The Court is, on its own account, behaving in a more restrained
fashion under "traditional visions" of activism, while at the same time
paying more heed to its guardianship role ("core values"). Certainly, this
last point suggests that while the Court is behaving in a more restrained
manner along the "traditional visions" ofjudicial activism indicia, it is also
paying attention to its role as guardian of the constitution and protector
of liberties. This may seem at first blush to be a contradiction, but one
could easily surmise that a court that is less likely to offer constitutional
protections is at least likely to couch its abandonment of that protection
in the language of constitutional values. Thus, the Court is able to present
itself as fluent in the philosophy of core constitutional values, while at the
same time placing itself in a more conservative place vis-d-vis the role of
the legislature, previous courts, and the socio-legal effects of its decision
making.
These statistically significant results suggest a court that is adjudicating
in the "securitized society" described in the introduction to this article.
The conservatism of this course, as measured by its own discourse,
correlates conceptually with the paramountcy and universality of security
post-9/11 as a societal value and with the precaution-based logic that
critical scholars suggest permeates law and society after the 9/11 attacks.
It is not surprising that a high court would reflect some of the tensions
persisting in the society it adjudicates, especially after an event like 9/11.
It is interesting to postulate that such anxieties pervade the discourse of
the Court in the context of search and seizure law, yet we must be cautious
when making such claims.
It is of paramount importance to note that while the Court's discourse
has undergone some significant changes that align with theories of
securitization, as we have found, a more conservative and securitizing
discourse is not dispositive of the notion that 9/11 caused these changes.
We have, throughout this paper, explained that any suggestions that 9/11
played a role in these changes are correlative, and as we have made clear,
court composition and administrative shifts are likely interacting with a
post-9/11 effect resulting in the findings we have uncovered. These caveats
still render interesting findings; the most intriguing being that the Court
has shifted in its use of discourse in a way that seems more restrained,
conservative, and in alignment with securitization postulations.
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The results also merit some further discussion about the adapted Cohn/
Kremnitzer metric. Our results correspond with previous case law based
studies, which have discussed the potential liberty-diminishing effects
of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the last ten years.62 It is, however,
important to note that the results are a snapshot of Supreme Court discourse
in two distinct eras. The differences between the two eras could indicate
the event of 9/11 as a natural comparison point. In future studies it would
also be interesting to examine the effects on Supreme Court discourse on
a per decade basis since the Charter'sinception, or by Court composition.
Certainly these would be interesting explorations, but just as interesting
would be the measurement of these discourse effects in the realm of other
jurisprudential areas of police powers. The study of discourse, as we have
developed it, is a labour intensive project and the measurement of multiple
legal areas and eras would take many years of (relatively thankless)
analysis. The results would, however, provide an alternative narrative to
Supreme Court decision making beyond the precedent-based effects that
legal scholars prefer to assess.
The adapted Cohn/Kremnitzer discourse-based approach thus provides
a new language for assessing judicial output. With the model we can assess
broad changes in the discourse that a court uses in adjudicating complex
constitutional cases, and we can assess these results over numerous court
cases instead of the usual manner of assessing the incremental legal
changes that accrue in the development of the common law. Thus, the
model leaves us with an ability to empiricize broad structural changes
in decision making over various eras and, potentially, across numerous
jurisprudential areas of study. Like any empirical exercise we are limited
by noting that the changes are correlated with the events of 9/11 and there
is no model that could state with certainty that the events of 9/11 caused
a change in judicial discourse. Being aware of shifts in judicial discourse
over time periods might further support broader socio-legal claims being
made in the social sciences, might add a dose of empiricism to a usually
value-laden debate, or might provide a point of departure for disagreeing
with empirical methods in an area of study that is traditionally suspicious
of quantitative study. Whatever the utility of the instrument developed, it is
a useful complex of discourse measurements, which adds more nuance to
the usual bipolar arguments about a court being activist or restrained. The
62. Jochelson, "Sniffer Dogs," supra note 1; Jochelson, "Trashcans," supra note 1; Nathan Forester,
"Electronic Surveillance, Criminal Investigations, and the Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Canada:
Regressive U-Turn or a Mere Bump in the Road Towards Charter Justice?" (2010) 73 Sask L Rev 23;
Jordan Hauschildt, "Blind Faith: The Supreme Court of Canada, s 24(2) and the Presumption of Good
Faith Police Conduct" (2010) 56:4 Crim LQ 469.
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Court clearly exercises its discourse in numerous directions in any given
era and likely does so differently in alternate areas of law. The degree of
potential complexity is astounding and can only enrich our understandings
of law and society as we embark on future research projects.
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Table 2: Comparison of means pre-9/11 and
post-9/11 in Supreme Court decisions

N
Judicial Stability
Interpretation
Majoritarian/Autonomy
Judicial Reasoning
Activism Threshold
Judicial Remit
Rhetoric
Obiter
Comparative Sources
Judicial Voices
Extent of Decision
Legal Background
Core Values

54

31

4.07

3.32

(2.46)

(2.06)

3.24

2.94

(1.92)

(1.34)

2.37

1.71

(2.33)

(1.72)

3.96

3.45

(2.36)

(1.50)

3.83

4.52

(2.15)

(1.71)

1.69

1.55

(95)

(1.23)

4.31

3.48

(2.72)

(2.78)

2.78

2.55

(2.25)

(2.31)

3.48

2.19

(2.96)

(1.97)

4.63

3.55

(2.75)

(2.79)

4.52

3.71

(2.74)

(2.41)

4.30

3.35

(2.56)

(2.06)

5.35
(2.31)

4.65

-7.5%

-1.44*

-3.0%

-. 78

-6.6%

-1.38*

-5.1%

-1.22

6.9%

1.61*

-1.4%

-. 57

-8.3%

-1.38*

-2.3%

-0.45

-12.9%

-2.40***

-10.8%

-1.75**

-8.1%

-1.37*

-9.5%

-1.94**

-7.0%

.

-1.39*

(2.15)

*p<.10, * *p<.05, ***p<. 01, all tests one-tailed. Standarddeviations are in parentheses.
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